Read e-book Asymmetric Warfare (Lawless Violence Book 1)

Free download. Book file PDF easily for everyone and every device. You can download and read online Asymmetric Warfare (Lawless Violence Book 1) file PDF Book only if you are registered here. And also you can download or read online all Book PDF file that related with Asymmetric Warfare (Lawless Violence Book 1) book. Happy reading Asymmetric Warfare (Lawless Violence Book 1) Bookeveryone. Download file Free Book PDF Asymmetric Warfare (Lawless Violence Book 1) at Complete PDF Library. This Book have some digital formats such us :paperbook, ebook, kindle, epub, fb2 and another formats. Here is The CompletePDF Book Library. It's free to register here to get Book file PDF Asymmetric Warfare (Lawless Violence Book 1) Pocket Guide.

While there are to date many relevant articles and studies devoted to the description of Hybrid Warfare HW , these studies could be considered as being just convergent building blocks towards a comprehensive and generally accepted definition. The Allied discussion on HW has favored a pragmatic approach towards the recent manifestations of HW, based on a comprehensive description and analysis of the phenomenon, followed by the development of a relevant strategy, instead of engaging in a scholastic, conceptual effort of adopting agreed definitions.

Hybrid warfare is supported through comprehensive hybrid strategies based on a broad, complex, adaptive and often highly integrated combination of conventional and unconventional means, overt and covert activities. Hybrid strategies can be applied by both state and non-state actors, through different models of engagement. These activities are performed by military, paramilitary, irregular and civilian actors, whose goals are political, geopolitical and strategic.

Pentagon Sets "Asymmetric" Warfare as High Priority

We are analyzing the hybrid warfare, looking at all the nuances of the hybrid threats, and announcing a new way to exert power, i. But if we are taking a breath and looking not so far in history, we realize that hybrid warfare is not really new: we have all seen before energy security used as a political weapon, conventional military maneuvers combined with powerful cyber-attacks and increased propaganda spread through new media.

I believe that when we observe a disturbing pattern happening several times, although in various degrees of ampleness and coherence, we may rethink our previous responses and reconsider our past counter-actions. The purpose is a multi-faceted one: to better prepare ourselves, to be more pro-active, to extend a helping hand to our partners and to assume supporting measures, instead of reacting about countless breaches of international legal regulations. The topic that we are to address is getting an increasing attention on both national and international arena.

I believe that a good understanding of the complexity of the hybrid warfare or asymmetric threats, concepts that are currently used in covering almost all changes in the international security environment, contributes to a better coordination of efforts in countering them. I will try to underline main features of the hybrid warfare concept and to raise questions and possible approaches on this topic as possible food for thought for your debate. Hybrid warfare is not new: I am sure that the events in Ukraine in March and how they developed leading to Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea were of no surprise to intelligence and security experts.

Hybrid Warfare is not a new phenomenon, but the use of the term is recent, and the concept came to the attention of European scholars, experts and policy makers with the start of the conflict in Crimea. At the high end of the spectrum of hybrid warfare tools is the military force. Hence, one rightfully expects to see commensurate military measures, reflected in national and allied defence policies.

This chapter therefore takes a look first at the types of military capabilities and level of readiness necessary to counter hybrid warfare. It emphasizes the requirements for relatively light, highly maneuverable forces, capable to operate in urban environment and work with local communities, along with a capacity to achieve and maintain information and knowledge superiority and to repel an assault from the air or the sea.

Then it calls for enhanced cooperation, coordination, and collaboration C3 among multiple stakeholders that cover a spectrum well beyond the traditional remits of the security sector. Towards the provision of adequate capabilities and effective C3, the author emphasizes organizational agility and adaptiveness. The final section discusses the need to strengthen the integrity of defence organizations, thus limiting opponents' opportunities to influence the behavior of decision-makers and other defence personnel. The hybrid warfare in Eastern Ukraine didn't appear suddenly, without a proper preparation in terms of military preparedness, recruiting, training, identifying local support and fundamental changes in the mood of the population.

Everything has been put in place after a very clear long term propaganda and control of the public space, but especially based on a well-established informational war developed in the region of Donbas and also at different levels in the whole of Ukraine. The difference in the region of Donetsk and Luhansk was is that it was a more targeted operation and the population had a higher degree of openness in absorbing this propaganda fitting with local beliefs, cultural background and level of education of the average population, including the presence of former members of the institutions present in the Soviet Union period.

about the author

This capacity and possibility to replicate the change of the perception of a given targeted population, by inoculating a pre-determined narrative and alternative reality that fits in the plans of the aggressor, could be used for further developing the war inside Ukraine, especially in the larger region called Novorossia.

The use of strategies and tactics that might be labeled as hybrid, either by state or non-state actors caused a debate on the history and development of such approaches. While they are not entirely new, by comparing, for instance, the current Russian approach in this respect to its older versions, one might notice some elements of novelty. Furthermore, the rapid development of information technology offered new tools in support of a hybrid approach, including means for amplifying messaging and propaganda to unprecedented levels, far more difficult to counter without proper mechanisms.

Today's world conflicts have been diversified according with participants objectives. These wars are theoretically clear but in practice there are differences of interpretation accordingly with combatants' intentions. All these wars have a common need to clarify not only objectives but to classify them according with a matrix. This common need is Intelligence. Planning, collection, analysis and dissemination of Intelligence is different from one type of war to another one.

The presented paper try to underline how these actions must be effected according with which type of war. The primary purpose of this paper is to identify both differences, and convergences between psychological, information, and hybrid warfare. Secondly, I will highlight the role of information within the hybrid warfare, analyzing the example provided by the conflict in Ukraine.

There would be presented different components of this issue, with a focus on the information flow, traditional and social media campaigns. Finally, I will assess possible solutions that intelligence organizations could provide to these information challenges in order to counter hybrid warfare. In terms of methodology, I use the general principles of comparative and content analysis.

While corruption and national security can intersect along several lines, the possible connections between the two concepts have not been properly addressed in the social science literature. The paper aims at an elaboration of these connections, by providing a conceptual analysis of the link between corruption and national security.

The phenomenon of corruption is conceptualized as a security vulnerability, which is understood as an internal characteristic of the state, impeding it from properly responding to threats. After presenting a brief overview of how the phenomenon of corruption can affect different sectors of human activity and different facets of national security, the paper outlines the possible forms of corruption in the defense sector.

It argues that this sector is potentially subject to corruption due to a number of specific characteristics and shows the corrupt practices identified by the literature on the issue.

Books by Tahir Tamer Kumkale (Author of Atatürk'ün Ekonomi Mucizesi)

The paper concludes by presenting NATO's Building Integrity program as a potential solution to the issue of corruption in defense. The military conflict in the east of Ukraine is a result of division of the Ukrainian society depending on the cultural influence of the milieu that has existed and evolved throughout the history, that of divergences of the Kiev political elite and the geopolitical interests in this area shown by the West the EU and NATO on one part, and by the Russian Federation on the other part. The military conflict in the East of Ukraine has started with the protest of the Ukrainian society against the governing elite when the latter refused to sign the EU Association Agreement November , but it became a determining one in the decline of the American unipolarity at the international arena in prefiguration of the European security and demonstration of influence of the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet space.

If initially the internal political crisis that Ukraine has faced may be interpreted as a reaction of the society towards shifting of the national interest from the West to the East of the policy promoted by the president that was in office at that time, Victor Ianukovici, consequently this conflict has transformed for the young Ukrainian state in that of defending the whole territorial integrity. A Battlespace perspective on the depth of hybrid warfare as seen in Ukraine, has a backdraft and also the butterfly effect.

Hyper accelerated reengineering or reinventing is required on all levels, strategic, tactical and operational. Hybrid warfare can only evolve if no interventions are installed such is the nature of this dynamic system. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield rests on multirole in a multi-operational theatre which would incorporate all these factions: civil wars, army factions, quasi-military units, partisans with outside support, insurgents, militarized criminal gangs, grounds for violent extremist organizations, communal and commodity riots, overall - General Lawlessness.

The nature of warfare has been changing dramatically. It has shifted from a classical symmetrical interstate war to a form that has long been around, yet in a less prominent way. In asymmetrical warfare, the conflicting parties are more and more differing in size and combatant capability. The rule of the equality of weaponry does not hold for this constellation. The less dominant party is enticed to resort to a lawless method of military action to compensate for the overwhelming power advantage of the opponent.

Download PDF Asymmetric Warfare (Lawless Violence Book 1)

The conflicting parties do not hold the same war goals and have different ways and practices to conduct their maneuvers and strategies. Transnational terroristic groups such as the Islamic State ISIS or Al Qaida utilize the power misbalance for their benefit by not complying to on the Westphalian peace based interstate legislation. The previous belief that reciprocity is a cardinal element to respect the jurisprudence is frequently elusive and interchanged with treacherous conduct. Clandestine military action replaces open assault," special rules" are made for "special situations.

Arguably, on of the biggest dissonance in international law stems from the concept of the right of self-defense, when is a state allowed to legally refer to it in a case of a military strike by a group? Moreover, does the attack have to have a certain scale, to be fall in the spectrum of self-defense? Firstly, according to Article 51 of the United Nation UN Charter, it is only a nation state that can conduct an "armed attack.

Secondly, a perspective that is commonly taken by the International Court of Justice ICJ stating that groups are capable of conducting armed strikes. However, the attack has to be ascribable to a nation state for the strike to be considered capable of triggering the of self-defense. During the last decade, the ICJ has altered its stand on the issue and caused uncertainty on how it will perceive the question in the time to come. Thirdly, an approach that has gained momentum in the academic community is that an armed strike can be conducted by a non-state group and still fulfill the criteria formulated in Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Meaning that the right to self-defense is applicable, even in the absence of a host state. The ever predominant topic of combating international terrorism is a reflection of the asymmetrical warfare. Nevertheless, state the global validity of the legislation for every individual, be it a dissimilar and asymmetrical body to all armed conflict.

However, asymmetrical warfare brings about a new legal challenge. Arguably, contemporary IHL does not manage to regulate this type of armed conflict. Longstanding, this part of IHL has been under regulated. Thereby, a protection disparity came about on civilians and a responsibility disparity concern the non-state actors. In conventional warfare, the parties agree in keeping the civilian casualties to a minimum.

In the case of asymmetrical warfare, civilians are situated close to the military strikes of the non-state actors, which creates three legal issues. Firstly, the advantages traced from protection duties incumbent on territorial states; do not fully apply.

Besides, to that, the civilians can potentially be exposed to significant damage by the retaliation of either party. Lastly, the nature of asymmetrical warfare create circumstances that bring benefit for the nonstate actors about in attacking civilians. Thereby they state actors is demonized in the public perception. As aforementioned, the leveling between military necessity and humanity demands a differentiation between combatants and those who according to IHL have to be protected, non-combatants.

These two notions are a main point of debate in IHL, the debate about adequacy circulates distinction.


The questions that are arising when non-state actors go to war are, for instance, who is a combatant? The legislation for war does not solely hold for armies, but also for forces that fit fulfill these characteristics:. That they have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance…; 3. That they carry arms openly; and 4. It is easy to accuse someone of terrorism in a situation where the distinction between combatants and non-combatants is blurred or where there are no obvious military targets that can be attacked.

A massive flow of refugees can have significant effects—intended or not—on psychological and strategic warfare for several reasons: 1 the flow of refugees can attract the attention of the international community; 2 massive migration can destabilize the region that receives the refugees; 3 refugee camps can be hotbeds for recruiting new fighters; and 4 humanitarian aid to refugee camps often finds its way to the fighting insurgents. These low-intensity conflicts typically have fewer casualties than interstate wars, but they pose more dangers to civilians and they can be quite long-lasting.

Therefore, they have a very significant regalizing effect and they often lead to political or religious radicalization. Even the smallest ethnic or religious differences are amplified in this process. Ethnicity is a result of conflict as much as a cause of it. The sponsor countries may be affected, however, if they are hit by terrorist attacks or other forms of retribution or if they receive a massive influx of refugees from the conflict zone. The violence may spill over the boundaries of the initial conflict, and we may see blowback effects when radicalized proxy fighters become enemies of their former sponsors, as in Afghanistan, Syria, and several other countries see chapter 5.

The infrastructure is often severely damaged; powerful crime organizations do not disappear when the conflict ends, and a proxy may continue to be dependent on its sponsor.